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THEISM, THE POSTMODERNIST BURIAL OF 
METAPHYSICS, AND INDIAN MIND-BODY DUALISM
Vladimir K. Shokhin
There is a post-modernist myth that metaphysics has always been an exclu-
sively Western heritage. This article refutes such a view by reviewing the 
many centuries of debate between Indian mind-body dualists and champions 
of reductionist physicalism. It also suggests the relevance of the Indian dual-
istic arguments for contemporary discussions of the mind-body issue.
I
Mind-body dualism has long been integral, not only to the philosophy 
of mind, but also to the philosophical foundations of theism. Indeed, the 
direct opposition between dualism and two rival ontologies of mind is 
of very old age. One of these rivals is physicalism, or naturalistic reduc-
tionism, or the identity theory of mind, all of which allow the status of 
substance only to the body with its functions. The other is the denial of 
substantiality of both material and spiritual kinds, that is, the reduction of 
the self to discrete dynamic elements of consciousness and their objects. 
If either of these standpoints is admitted, theism loses a secure founda-
tion. Is it not the case that if the soul be an epiphenomenon of corporeal 
constituents destined to be annihilated with their destruction, or nothing 
more than a flux of sensations, volitions, cogitations, and so on, coordi-
nated by nothing, it can be neither a recipient of eternal bliss nor anything 
like the image of God destined to acquire his likeness? And, consequently, 
that all practical claims of theism (the acquisition of theōsis being the most 
important among them) turn out to be senseless? One may object that 
some philosophers have embraced one or other of these positions without 
renouncing theism,1 but that says less about the compatibility of theism 
with the above-mentioned doctrines than the lack of consistency in these 
philosophers’ minds.
It is, in contrast, quite consistent that popularizers of postmodern-
ism who reject theism also consider mind-body dualism outdated.2 This 
1Among the philosophers of Enlightenment one can name Joseph Priestly and some 
deists, like John Toland and John Collins and some others. The contemporary approval of 
physicalism from the side of theists might be exemplified by P. van Inwagen, Metaphysics 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 4–5, 178–183.
2So, according to Mark Taylor, while humanistic (modern) atheism transfers the attributes 
of God to human nature, more progressive posthumanistic (postmodern) atheology carries 
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attitude must be seen within the broader context of their philosophy. The-
ism is rejected because it is based on classical metaphysics. The latter is in 
turn rejected because “the pillars” of contemporary philosophy rejected it: 
in the beginning Nietzsche, who demonstrated the death of “a metaphysi-
cal God,” then Heidegger, who endorsed such a verdict because meta-
physics had supposedly led to the oblivion of Being, the power of technics 
and nihilism, and then Derrida and Lyotard who declared it to be the 
philosophical expression of “onto-theo-teleo-phallo-phono-logocentrism” 
(which is to be treated by the method of “deconstruction”) and, corre-
spondingly, of the totalitarian claim to a universal truth (which, with a 
universal rationality, became a justification for some modes of social orga-
nization, i.e., power). Finally, theism and metaphysics are also rejected be-
cause they are declared to be fruits of an outdated monotheism and Euro-
centrism unable to withstand the challenge of non-European thought that 
has offered a successful alternative to outdated European rationalism.3
The postmodernist negation of a universal rationality proves, however, 
as does any consistent nihilism (I use this term not in its Heideggerean but 
in the general sense), to be self-refuting. Surely, if any claim to a universal 
truth contains already totalitarianism, then the statement of the non-exis-
tence of such truth cannot be an exception to this rule and must express 
(let us use Nietzschean idioms) someone’s will to power. And if it is a 
universal rationality whose “deconstruction” gives us understanding of 
what took place in Auschwitz (as alleged by Lyotard), then also the very 
attempt to dismantle metaphysics, being carried out by means of the same 
rationality, cannot be relieved from the same responsibility.
But another claim, that metaphysical “logocentrism” remains the leg-
acy of the outdated Hellenic-Mediaeval European tradition alone,4 needs 
not a logical but historical refutation. To examine the most abundant non-
European philosophical tradition would be most useful in this regard. I 
mean Indian philosophy, which prior to the modern age had not been 
in the least influenced by the West and may be considered, therefore, 
purely autochthonous.
the death of God to completion by denying the idea of autonomous selfhood as well and 
doesn’t fail to notice that “the death of God is at the same time the death of the self.” M. Tay-
lor, Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 20. 
3On “the great principle of polytheism” as an alternative to monotheism and a pattern of 
radical pluralism see, e.g., the paper, “Lob der Polytheismus über Monomythie und Poly-
mythie” in O. Marquard, Abschied vom Prinzipiellen: Philosophische Studien (Stuttgart: P. rec-
lam. jun., 1981), pp. 91–116; and J.-F. Lyotard and J.-L. Thébaud, Au juste: conversations (Paris: 
Bourgois, 1979), pp. 33, 35. One of the most typical attacks on metaphysics as the legacy of 
Eurocentric worldview one can find in G. Vattimo, After Christianity (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002).
4Here the representatives of process-theology are close to postmodernist theologizing, 
because they reject not only creationism in the real sense, but also such fundamental Divine 
attributes as simplicity, impassibility, immutability, necessity and eternity in favor of their 
“dipolar theism.” One of them, Nicholas Wolterstorff, who prefers God to be more everlast-
ing than eternal, also treats metaphysics, which is basic for the abovementioned attributes, 
as a specific Hellenic heritage, outdated in the context of the today’s understanding of the 
Bible. 
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II
The powerful trend of Indian philosophy which has elaborated a very 
many-sided mind-body dualism is designated usually by the Sanskrit 
compound term ātmavāda (cf. the Palian attavāda). It means “the teaching 
of Ātman” or “the teaching that Ātman exists,” Ātman being understood 
as the permanent essence, beginningless and endless, correlated with the 
psychophysical aggregate of a living being but ontologically foreign to 
both its outward and inward body, the locuses of its sensual, active, and 
mental capacities. The term is far from being monosemantic: in some im-
portant contexts it is similar to “soul,” more often it is closer to “spirit,” 
but at the same time it is closer to “the self” and “the pure subject” which 
differs from everything that can be objectified. The name of ātmavāda con-
trasts this doctrine to those two forms of opposition to mind-body dual-
ism mentioned earlier. In India their equivalents were dehatmāvāda (“the 
teaching that Ātman is the body”), that is, materialist physicalism-cum-
eliminativism, and anātmavāda (“the teaching that Ātman doesn’t exist”), 
or the Buddhist substitution of Ātman by fluxes of instant and decen-
tered spots of consciousness-cum-existence (dharmas). The champions of 
ātmavāda were more careful in controversy with the Buddhists, their much 
more sophisticated and influential opponents, but for investigation of in-
tercultural substance dualism their engagement with the materialists is 
of more interest. We will follow now its main landmarks from the begin-
nings up to the end of the early medieval period.
It was already before the birth of philosophy in India, in the touching 
myth of the ancient Chāndogya-Upaniṣad (from the eighth to seventh cen-
tury B.C.) about the king of gods Indra and demon Virocana, two disciples 
of Prajāpati, the father of all living beings, where anxieties of the pious 
Brāhmaṇic society about naturalistic moods were first reflected. Accord-
ing to this tale, these two characters, as representatives of their clans and 
desirous of the knowledge of Ātman, studied thirty-two years at the feet 
of Prajāpati before he decided to examine them. Having commanded them 
to array and adorn themselves and look in a pan of water, he declared 
their reflections in water to be the Ātman they were searching for. While 
Virocana returned to the demons with a tranquil heart, Indra realized that 
such an Ātman, which depends on successful and unsuccessful condi-
tions of the body and so perishes immediately after the latter’s destruc-
tion, could not satisfy him. He therefore remained with Prajāpati about 
seventy more years before the acquisition of full knowledge (VIII.7–12).5 
Of more interest is, however, the concise description of those who, like 
Virocana, regard the self as the body: they are not givers, have no faith and 
do not offer sacrifices (VIII.8.5). So even at the dawn of Indian thought, it 
was understood that the teaching of the self as reducible to the body was 
incompatible with religious faith and duties.
5Here and below I refer to the editions of the Pali Text Society; the first number indicates 
the corresponding volumes, the second one pages. 
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Up to the time of the first philosophers of India (or, what is the same, of 
the first attempts at rational critique and systemization of world-outlook), 
which coincides with the Ṡramaṇic intellectual revolution of the fifth cen-
tury B.C., this intuition of the Brāhmaṇists had been fully confirmed. Ac-
cording to the Buddhist Pali Samaññaphalasutta, Ajita Kesakambala, the 
leader of the materialists, insisted that inasmuch as a man was a mere 
combination of the four natural elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) 
and is to be disintegrated after death back into them, cremation should 
be the only real offering and only fools talk about the use of generosity 
(Dīgha-Nikāya I.55). There are also several other Buddhist and one Jaina 
source of good antiquity where such views are reproduced. In addition, in 
the Brahmajāla-sutta (Dīgha-Nikāya I.34–36), the views of those who insist 
on “the final destruction, decline and nonbeing” of men are referred to, 
and this doctrine is designated as ucchedavāda (“the teaching of destruc-
tion”), a name later extended to the whole teaching of the materialists.
The same sources also describe the teaching of another famous Ṡramaṇic 
philosopher, Pakudha Kaccāyana, who held the opposite viewpoint. Ac-
cording to the afore-mentioned Samaññaphalasutta, he selected the seven 
essences (kāya) “by none made, fabricated neither directly, nor indirectly, 
barren, stable as the picks of mountains, immutable as pillars” whose 
combinations give us what we call living beings (Dīgha-Nikāya I.56). He 
included in his list the four natural elements which were accepted by Ajita 
and everyone else, but, in addition, the essences of contentment and suffer-
ing and the spiritual principle (jīva). Although the ethical conclusions de-
duced by Pakudha from his scheme did not surpass those inferred by Ajita 
from his unsophisticated ontology,6 his philosophical world picture was 
beyond comparison much richer. The Jaina version of his list of essences, 
from which contentment and suffering were subtracted, space added and 
the spiritual principle remained untouched (Sutrakṛtāñga I.1.1.15), also 
supports the view that Pakudha was the first consistent substance dualist 
in Indian philosophy.
In the opinion of some Indologists, the direct opposition between Aji-
ta and Pakudha is recollected in Pali literature.7 But of more importance 
is the fact that the mind-body problem was included in the list of topics 
which were discussed by professional Ṡramaṇic philosophers at their ses-
sions. From many Pali texts one can derive technical designations of both 
mutually opposed positions (Majjhima-Nikāya I.484, etc.). The materialist 
one was designated as taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ (“what is the body, the same is 
the soul”) which literally corresponds to the contemporary identity theory 
of mind, and the dualist one as aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ (“the body is 
6According to him, when a man cleaves a head in twain with a sharp sword, he does not 
thereby deprive anyone of life because the sword only penetrates between the seven sub-
stances, and when someone teaches another one it is, in the final analysis, only an illusion, 
for in reality the self is not the doer. 
7See, e.g., B. Barua, A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy (Delhi, etc.: Motilal Banar-
sidass, 1970 [1st ed. 1921]), p. 294.
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one, the soul is other”). From the same Ṡramaṇic century also dates, most 
likely, the ethical counter-argument launched against materialistic mind-
body monism by Jina Mahāvīra and his first disciples, i.e., that those who 
hold to this view cannot distinguish between good and evil.
The topic of the existence of Ātman as the immaterial essence substan-
tially different from the body and its functional structure remains one of 
the most important subjects of controversy in the period of the early philo-
sophical schools as well, i.e., from the fourth century B.C. up to the second 
century A.D. At least, some dialogues from the didactic books of the great 
Indian epic Mahābhārata give evidence concerning it. For example, in the 
Bharadvāja-Bhṛgu dialogue the first character, acting as the champion of 
a generalized materialist position, tries to prove that Ātman is in every 
respect superfluous. While the functions of wind and fire in the fivefold 
body8 are entirely certified, the same cannot be said about those of Ātman, 
nor that it could be perceivable during the death of a living being. Fur-
thermore, the functions of the five elements are both necessary and suf-
ficient for the sustenance of the body, while it is difficult to find a place for 
Ātman in this respect. Hence all priestly hopes are in vain, for a man sac-
rificing a cow will perish after it and, “if the root of a cut tree does not put 
out shoots, even if its seeds grow further, wherein goes the dead?” Bhṛgu, 
a spokesman of ātmavāda, retorts that the soul does not suffer annihilation 
after the destruction of the body, in the same way as seemingly extinct fire 
is preserved in reality in a subtle condition, and it is incorrect to consider 
the five elements sufficient for the functioning of a living organism, while 
the appearance of Ātman’s return into them is actually only its separation 
from them after temporal interaction (XII.179–180).9
Thus the main materialist argument was, according to this dialogue, 
that the soul and its actions are not perceivable and, therefore, nonexis-
tent, whereas the dualist argument was that not everything existent is 
necessarily perceivable. The latter statement seems reasonable enough, 
though one has an impression that the first side was better prepared for 
debate. Still more materialist arguments are collected in another chapter, 
where the achievements of the famous thinker of the Sāṃkhya tradition 
of philosophy named Pañcaśikha are eulogized. The author, wishing to 
present the materialistic position, lists many examples of causal factors 
(a seed of a tree, the magnet and iron, the sun stone devouring solar rays, 
the soil imbibing water, etc.) to show that all causal processes work only 
in the sphere of material things. Other examples developed specially for 
these debates (one has to bear in mind that in India examples in general 
had the force of demonstration) were also adduced by Indian physical-
ists, e.g., if eternal things like Ātman exist, then an immortal king on the 
earth also ought to exist; but the latter case is an absurdity, so the first 
8That is, consisting of earth, water, fire, wind, and space.
9Here and below I refer to the critical edition of the Ṡāntiparvan book of Mahābhārata 
published in 1954 by Shripad Krishna Belvalkar. 
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one should also be as well. They also tried to support their doctrines with 
epistemological arguments: to admit ceaseless things one has to refer to 
the instruments of knowledge (pramāṇa), but perception, the only one reli-
able among them, repudiates their existence. But the counter-arguments 
of the real dualist Pañcaśikha were also much better prepared than those 
of the mythical Bhṛgu. He argued that the fact that the soul separates from 
the body after the death of a living being does not mean its own corrup-
tion; that successful invocation of incorporeal gods refutes the statement 
that all causal links are natural; and that the cessation of a living being’s 
actions after its physical death testifies against the capability of the body 
to be their origin in this life-time (XII.211).
The Sāṃkhya dualists continued to oppose naturalistic physicalism 
during the classical stage of Indian philosophy from about the second to 
ninth century A.D., when the most important basic texts, i.e., the sūtras 
and kārikās, of the main schools, along with commentaries thereon came 
into being. Īśvarakṛṣṇa (from the fourth to fifth century A.D.), the author 
of the canonical Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, adduces five reasons for the existence of 
puruṣa which is the same as Ātman. They are as follows: (1) all aggrega-
tions exist for the sake of something else; (2) there must be something op-
posite to the three guṇas;10 (3) there must also be some controlling factor 
required by nonconscious ones; (4) there must also be a subject of experi-
ence different from the latter; (5) there is an inclination in the world to 
seek freedom, or isolation from the world (vs.17). The main philosophical 
method used here (as elsewhere in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā) is the deduction 
of essences from some objective characteristics which must have onto-
logical foundations.11
But the most detailed commentary on the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, the Yukti-
dīpikā (circa the sixth–seventh centuries A.D.), opens a further space of 
controversy. Though its author pays more attention to the Buddhist 
anātmavāda, he does not lose a chance to answer typical materialist ob-
jections. So in his comments on the same kārikā 17 the generalized ma-
terialist opponent states that no instrument of knowledge confirms the 
existence of imperceivable objects, such as puruṣa. Sāṃkhya’s answer is 
that the latter’s existence is established by inference based on general cor-
relation, for the body, being composite like a bed or other artifact, is meant 
for something other than itself. The materialist offers a seemingly reason-
able objection, i.e., that one composite may be meant for some other, as 
the bed for the man Devadatta. But it is not too easy to take the author of 
the Yukti-dīpikā unawares: the heterogeneous principle under discussion 
10According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy these are the three constituents of the primaeval 
matter (Prakṛti), or profoundest dimensions of being, which determine everything with the 
exception of puruṣas. They are experienced on a more psychological level as pleasure, pain, 
and delusion, and on a more ontological one as intelligibility, activity, and restraint. 
11In a similar way the existence of Prakṛti is deduced from the necessity for finite specific 
things to require a cause, to have some common foundation for their inner homogeneity, to 
imply the corresponding potentiality, etc. (vss. 15–16). 
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cannot be composite just because of its imperceptibility, on which the op-
ponent himself insists.
While the Sāṃkhyas postulated a spiritual principle directly as the nec-
essary condition of the establishment of experience, the Naiyayikas in-
ferred it through the abstract inference “by residue” (śeṣavat), that is, by 
excluding all other explanations of experience. That is why, according to 
the Nyāya-sūtras (from the third to fourth century A.D.), desire, aversion, 
effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition are inferential marks of Ātman (I.1.16). 
Both the composer of the sūtras and his famous commentator Vātsyāyana 
(from the fourth to fifth centuries A.D.) enter into direct polemics with 
Indian naturalistic physicalism. The latter first develops an ethical argu-
ment against mind-body monism, namely that even a killer, according to 
the teaching of the monists, is not responsible for his crime because mate-
rial elements are not capable of bearing responsibility (III.1.4). The gen-
eralized materialist questions this inference to Ātman by supposing that 
desire, aversion, and so on may belong to the earth and other components 
of the human body as well, since they are capable of activity and inactiv-
ity. The Nayayikas reply that activity and inactivity belong also to an axe 
and many other inanimate things, but no one ascribes to them mental ca-
pacities. The materialist tries to get out of this difficulty by indicating that 
desire, aversion, and so on inhere in the body every time, whereas they do 
not in the case of an axe. But Vātsyāyana regards this objection as uncon-
vincing, for it contradicts the major premise of the materialist’s syllogism, 
i.e., that everything which is active and inactive is endowed with desire 
and the like. Besides, he continues, since the body is composed of many 
particles capable, according to the opponent, of mental capacities, the re-
sult should be an assumption of many subjects of experience in the same 
body, which is a sheer absurdity. In addition, the activity and inactivity of 
material things are, in general, due to qualities of quite different entities, 
such as effort, which has a common locus with saṃskāra, viz., the balance 
of immaterial dharma and adharma (III.2.35–37).
But it was Ṡaṃkara (from the seventh to eighth centuries A.D.), the fa-
mous founder of Advaita-Vedānta, who offered the most considered refu-
tation of mind-body monism in Indian philosophy of the classical period. 
The following are his main arguments in his commentary on the sūtras of 
Vedānta, the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya: (1) in contrast to attributes of the body, 
thinking or memory are imperceivable in principle; (2) we are conscious 
of the elements of the body, but had consciousness been their quality, this 
would have been impossible, as it is impossible for fire to burn itself or for 
an actor to ride on his own shoulder;12 (3) in contrast to corporeal compo-
nents which are subject to everlasting change, the self is invariably identi-
cal to itself, and common experience confirms this when one says, e.g., 
“This is I who have seen this or that”; (4) from the fact that consciousness 
12One may mention that these examples were borrowed by the Advaitins (among many 
other things) from the Buddhist Madhyamaka system, starting with the texts ascribed to its 
founder Nāgārjuna (from the second to third century A.D.). 
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occurs where the body is present, it does not follow that it is an attribute 
of the latter, just as although visual perception occurs when daylight is 
present, it does not follow that perception is an attribute of light itself 
(III.3.54). Other of Ṡaṃkara’s arguments may be considered as amplifica-
tions of these. For example, in the Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya, having listed the 
main attributes of Ātman as contrary to those of the body, i.e., the proper-
ties of consciousness, invariability, purity, and partlessness, he underlines 
that objects depend on consciousness for their existence, just as color de-
pends on the capacity of seeing for its manifestation (VI.2).
Ṡaṃkara’s disciple Sureśvara, who composed an enormous commen-
tary on his teacher’s commentary on the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad entitled Bṛ
hadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika, also engaged critically materialist argu-
ments. Here the generalized materialist (dehatmāvādin—see above) an-
nounces that the famous slogan of the same Upaniṣad, “Verily Ātman is 
Brahman” (IV.4.5), being contrary to perception, is to be interpreted fig-
uratively. Intelligence is born by combination of the four elements, and 
the most common self-identification, “I am a man,” shows that everyone 
identifies himself as the body. Sureśvara answers that, according to his 
opponent’s logic, a dead body must be seen as conscious since it too is 
a combination of elements. He also mentions that some yogis remember 
their previous lives, which proves that a person is not to be reduced to his 
present body, and asks why the body, supposed to be Ātman, is some-
times conscious and sometimes not (III.116–155).
III
Let us now draw some conclusions. Some Indian dualists’ premises cor-
respond to those of Plato, i.e., that the spiritual principle is self-moving in 
contrast to material elements, which are inert by nature. Others (which are 
more essential) are similar to those of Wolff, Reimarus, Mendelsson, and 
other philosophers of the Enlightenment, i.e., that the spiritual principle is 
uncomposite in contrast to the elements, which are naturally composite. 
Finally another, and perhaps the most important, has not been typical of 
classical Western substance dualism at all. I mean here a transcendental 
point of departure according to which the subject of experience cannot be 
placed on the same level of reality with its objects (including the corporeal 
locus of the subject itself), and this ontological gap between them provides 
the necessary condition for every experience. Some arguments of the Indi-
an dualists sound naive now, e.g., that a dead body must be seen by their 
opponents as conscious inasmuch as a combination of elements is present 
there, or the ethical argument of the Naiyayikas that physicalism leads to 
immorality (since for consistent materialists ethical considerations should 
not be very persuasive). But the arguments from the ontological difference 
between composite and uncomposite entities, on the one hand, and pure 
subjectivity and objectivity, on the other, adduced in the beginning by 
the Sāṃkhyas and later reinforced by Advaitins, have, I think, sufficient 
cumulative force that they remain entirely relevant. There is no doubt that 
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Ṡaṃkara’s very graphic argument about the inability of fire to burn itself 
and for a dancer to ride on his own shoulder belongs to the “gold re-
serves” of intercultural mind-body dualism. The same is true also of his 
argument that from the statement that an essence X with attributes A, B, C 
correlates with an essence Y with contrary attributes, it in no way follows 
that X is Y, and of his example of visual capacity and daylight.
Returning now to the outset of this paper, it has become evident that 
the postmodernist assignment of metaphysics to a purely European heri-
tage proves to be only an illiterate ideological myth, revealing just will to 
power—over unqualified minds. Moreover, different versions of Indian 
mind-body dualism do correspond to the diversity of metaphysical re-
flection. The dualism of Pakudha Kaccāyana grows from examination of 
the capacity (or lack thereof) of substances to be atomic, i.e., irreducible 
to anything more primary, unchangeable and eternal, criteria which are 
purely metaphysical in nature. Dualism of the classical Sāṃkhya grows 
from the deduction of first principles based, in turn, on a hierarchy of 
speculatively possible predicates of things. Dualism of Nyāya grows from 
inference of substances based, this time, on the reasonable localization 
of their actions and attributes. And one cannot but recognize in all these 
kinds of mind-body dualism the general mark of classical metaphysics, 
i.e., the investigation of imperceivable entities that lie behind the percep-
tible empirical world.
Nor do we have reason to agree with the popular view that Indian doc-
trines (as non-European—see above), including those of the soul, are best 
seen as a challenge to Western theism. Certainly there is not a full coin-
cidence, the main and very important difference being that India lacked 
the teaching of the creation of the soul, instead regarding the soul as onto-
logically independent and, correspondingly, beginningless by nature and 
coming to be merely through reincarnation.13 But this is only a half of the 
truth, for I do not know any serious scholar who has regarded, e.g., Plato’s 
psychology, as we know it from the Phaedo or Phaedrus, to be a challenge 
to theism, although the soul has there similar characteristics. On the con-
trary, the similarities with the theistic teaching of the soul are much more 
important. Here one may recollect a clear distinction between two kinds 
of truths about God made by Thomas Aquinas in Summa contra Gentiles 
I.3. Aquinas distinguishes truths that exceed any rational understanding 
(such as that God is both threefold and one at the same time) and those ac-
cessible to it (such as that God is existent and one), the latter having been 
proved by those philosophers who were led by the natural light of reason 
(ducti naturalis lumine rationis). In the same manner in our case rational 
truths about the soul, e.g., that it is ontologically heterogeneous to the 
body, uncomposite, reflective, and so on, might be filled in by the teach-
ing of its creation. At the same time the ancient Indian realization that the 
13Cf. one of Sureśvara’s arguments referred to above. According to the Nyāya philoso-
phers the initial instincts of a new-born child are to be explained by its recollections of its 
experiences in former lives. 
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soul’s reduction to the body is incompatible with any religion fully coin-
cides with the theistic worldview (see above).
Finally, the resources of Indian mind-body dualism have a legitimate 
role to play in theistic apologetics. In addition to those already mentioned, 
they cogently demonstrate the philosophical poverty of contemporary 
physicalism, which is a real challenge to theism, however doubtful it is 
from a rational point of view. Indeed, the interpretation of mind according 
to a behaviorist model of a computer system—which is only a variation on 
the theme of La Mettrie’s “man a machine” with disregard of an “engineer” 
and “programmer”14—cannot withstand the level of reflection of those In-
dian philosophers who for so many centuries combated reductionism.
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14In the final analysis this level of understanding mental phenomena is similar to explain-
ing a piano concerto by the actions of a keyboard instrument alone with elimination of both 
the pianist and producer of the piano. 
